Software-based attacks (e.g., malware) pose a big threat to cryptographic software because they can compromise the associated cryptographic keys in their entirety. In this paper, we investigate key-insulated symmetric key cryptography, which can mitigate the damage caused by repeated attacks against cryptographic software. To illustrate the feasibility of key-insulated symmetric key cryptography, we also report a proof-of-concept implementation in the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) environment.
INTRODUCTION
The motivation of the present study is two-fold. From a system perspective, a cloud should facilitate secure communications between the applications that run in different Virtual Machines (VMs). A particularly devastating attack is that the attacker fully compromises the cryptographic keys associated with the cryptographic software. It is therefore imperative to mitigate the damage caused by such full (rather than partial) exposure of cryptographic keys. From a cryptographic perspective, the notion of key-insulated cryptography has been investigated but only in the public-key
Our contributions.
We present definition and construction of key-insulated symmetric key cryptography. We show how key-insulated symmetric key cryptography can be adopted to mitigate attacks against cryptographic cloud software, we consider its integration into Trusted Virtual Domain (TVD) [11] .
Related work.
There are three approaches to mitigate the damage caused by the full compromise of cryptographic keys. The first is the primitives approach. One strategy is to divide the system time into periods, and change the cryptographic key frequently. An example is forward-security [1, 2, 3] , which ensures that compromise of a key during one period does not allow the attacker to obtain the key in any past period. Another strategy is represented by the notion called threshold cryptosystems [4] , which splits the key (rather than the system time) into multiple shares such that a key is not compromised until after a sufficient number of shares are compromised. The second is the architectural approach. In this approach a cryptographic key is protected in a tamperresistant hardware [13] . The third is the hybrid approach. This approach has the advantages of the two approaches mentioned above. Two examples are key-insulated public key cryptosystems [7, 8] and intrusion-resilient public key cryptosystems [10, 5, 6] . The present paper follows this approach and investigates key-insulated symmetric key schemes.
KEY-INSULATED SYMMETRIC CRYP-TOGRAPHY

Model and Definition
The lifetime of the system is divided into periods 1, . . . , N (e.g., days). Each user/participant has a device (e.g., a hardware co-processor, or a trusted software module in VMM), and a networked computer. Denote by P the set of identities of the users (e.g., VMs), where |P| ≥ 2. At the beginning of time period t (1 ≤ t ≤ N ), each user's computer obtains certain information from the user's device, derives a key SKt for this time period (i.e., all the relevant users' computers obtain the same SKt). A networked computer is subject to repeated compromise. Although it is assumed to be harder, a device may also be compromised. Our model and definition of key-insulated symmetric key schemes are adapted from the ones of key-insulated public key cryptography [7, 8] , but here are some fundamental differences between the public-key setting and the secret-key setting. For correctness, we require that for every message M and
Security Definition
We consider three types of exposures: (1) ordinary key exposure, which models the (repeated) compromise of ID's computer and leaks SKt and SK (ID.Comp) ; (2) key-update exposure, which models the (repeated) compromise of ID's computer during the key-updating step and leaks SKt−1, SKt, and SK (ID.Comp) ); and (3) device master key exposure, which models the compromise of ID's device and leaks SK (ID.Dev) . Formally, we give the adversary access to three (possibly five) types of oracles.
• Key exposure oracle Exp SK (Dev) ,SK (Comp) (·, ·): It, on input t ∈ {1, . . . , N } and ID ∈ P, returns the period secret key SKt.
• Key exposure oracle Dev(·, ·): It, on input t ∈ {1, . . . , N } and ID ∈ P, returns SK (ID.Dev) .
• Left-or-right encryption oracle
N . It models encryption requests by the adversary on (period, message) pairs.
• We may allow the adversary to have access to encryption oracle E * SK (Dev) ,SK (Comp) (·, ·) that, on input t and M , computes and returns t, C def = E SKt (t, M ). This models a chosen-plaintext attack by the adversary.
• We may also allow the adversary to have access to decryption oracle D * SK (Dev) ,SK (Comp) (·) that, on input t, C , computes and returns D SKt ( t, C ). This models a chosen-ciphertext attack by the adversary.
We allow the adversary to interleave encryption requests and key exposure requests. Moreover, key exposure requests may be made adaptively and in any order. 
Note that t ID is the earliest point in time that ID's computer and device have been compromised. Define TP = {t ID |ID ∈ P}. Define tΠ = t such that t ∈ TP and ∀ ID ∈ P, t ≤ t ID . Note that tΠ is the earliest point in time that ID's computer and device have been compromised, which means that all of the cryptographic keys have been compromised. We say that Π is never-compromised if tΠ = ∞, and Π is compromised at time tΠ otherwise. Define
For a never-compromised Π, we require key-insulation specified below; for a Π that is compromised at some time tΠ, we require augmented key-insulation specified below. Informally, Π is key-insulated if the probability that any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary succeeds in guessing the value of bt for any un-exposed time period t is negligibly more than 1/2. More formally, Definition 3. (key-insulation) Let Π be a key-updating symmetric key scheme. For adversary A, define: 
Π is un-exposed at period t), and |T
Moreover, we say a (N − 1, N )-key-insulated symmetric key scheme achieves optimal key-insulation.
For the notion of key-insulation, it may be desirable to consider an extra property called secure key updates below. We call the following attack a key-update exposure at period t on ID's computer: an adversary breaks into user ID's computer while a key update is taking place (i.e., the exposure occurs between two periods t − 1 and t). In this case, the adversary receives SKt−1, SK Informally, we say Π is augmented key-insulated if the probability that any polynomial-time adversary succeeds in guessing the bit bt corresponding to LR E, b (t, M1, M2) is negligibly more than 1/2, where t < tΠ. More formally, Definition 5. (augmented key-insulation) Let Π be a keyupdating symmetric key encryption scheme. For adversary A, define the following: 
Key-Insulated Symmetric Key Scheme
Let (G, E, D) be a secure symmetric key cryptosystem, where G is the key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a key K, EK(·) is encryption algorithm, and DK (·) is the decryption algorithm. We refer to [12] for its security definitions. Let {fK } : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k be a pseudorandom function family keyed by K ∈ {0, 1} k [9] . The (N − 1, N )-keyinsulated symmetric key scheme Π for two party communication (i.e., |P| = 2) is specified as follows.
• Key Generation. This algorithm is executed in a secure environment. Suppose {xi} 1≤i≤4 are uniformly chosen from {0, 1} k . Alice stores (x1, x2) on her computer, and (x3, x4) on her device; Bob stores (x1, x3) on his computer, and (x2, x4) on his device.
• Device Key-Update. At the beginning of period t (1 ≤ t ≤ N ), Alice's device sends fx 3 (t) ⊕ fx 4 (t) to her computer, and Bob's device sends fx 2 (t) ⊕ fx 4 (t) to his computer.
• Computer Key-Update. The secret key for period t is SKt = fx 1 (t) ⊕ fx 2 (t) ⊕ fx 3 (t) ⊕ fx 4 (t), which can be derived by Alice's computer and Bob's computer.
• Encryption. For period t, set E SK t (t, M ) = E SK t (M ).
• Decryption. 
Integrating Key-Insulated Scheme with TVD
As illustrated in Figure 1(a) , a TVD allows a customer (Alice) to use multiple VMs running on top of multiple physical computers in the cloud. The communications between the applications running in the same TVD should be protected from the environment outside the TVD.
As illustrated in Figure 1(b) , where we consider two VMs running on top of the same Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) for the sake of simplicity, key-insulated symmetric key cryptography can mitigate the repeated exposures of secret keys. More specifically, we can let each VM hold a master key (called computer master key), and let the VMM hold a set of master keys (called device master keys). At the beginning of each time period, a VM receives from the device key-update software module a partial secret key, which is derived from the device master key. The computer key-update module will derive a period secret key from the partial secret key and the computer master key. The period secret key is the symmetric key for protecting the communications between the two VMs that belong to the same TVD. As a proof of concept, we report our implementation of key-insulated symmetric key scheme in the KVM environment as well as its performance measurements. Since the difference between standard symmetric key cryptography and key-insulated symmetric key cryptography is the key update operation at the beginning of each time period, the performance metric we consider is the key update time, which is dependent upon the number of VMs one will communicate with, and is dependent upon the number of VMs running on top of a single physical computer.
As a proof of concept, we implemented the key-insulated symmetric key scheme in the KVM environment. Our experimental system was a desktop computer. The hardware was two x86 processors at 2.5 GHz with 2GB memory. The Host OS was Ubuntu 11.10. The guest OS was Ubuntu 10.04. The device in our formal model was implemented as a small software module in KVM, called Device Key-Update, which implements the Device Key-Update algorithm. Similarly, we implemented a Computer Key-Update module in the VM. We choose to implement the device in KVM because we can modify the source code. Note that TPM does not allow one to run any third-party code.
There are two approaches to realize key-insulation in KVM. The difference between the two approaches is how the Device Key-Update module and the Computer Key-Update module communicate. Figure 2(a) demonstrates approach I, which utilizes the virtual CDROM mechanism. Specifically, the Device Key-Update module in KVM will write the key updates to a virtual CD (in the format of ISO file), and then "insert" the virtual CD into the CDROM device of the respective VM. Figure 2 (b) demonstrates approach II, which utilizes KVM's VirtioSerial feature that further allows the Computer Key-Update module to acknowledge the receiving of key updates from the Device Key-Update module.
Since the secure communications between VMs using the period secret keys are the same as the standard use of symmetric key schemes, we want to demonstrate that the key update operations do not incur any significant performance cost. This is justified by the fact that the cost for evaluating pseudorandom functions, for which we used AES-128, can be almost ignored in practice. may need to conduct secure communications with multiple or many other VMs, we measure the performance impact of the number of key updates (i.e., the number of VMs with which one VM communicates). Since a VMM needs to support multiple VMs simultaneously, we measure the performance impact of the number of VMs running on top of a physical machine. Figure 3 (a) compares the communication costs of the two approaches with respect to the number of key updates. In the experiments, we ran a single VM on top of KVM. Suppose one VM needs to conduct secure communications with up to 1,200 other VMs, which is possible with the TVD abstraction mentioned in the Introduction, the Computer KeyUpdate module in the VM needs to receive up to 1,200 key updates from the Device Key-Update module in the KVM. It is clear that Approach II is two orders of magnitude faster than Approach I. Because Approach II incurs very small communication cost, we also plotted the zoomed-in version of the curve. It is interesting to note that the communication cost of Approach I is roughly independent of the number of key updates; whereas, the communication cost of Ap- VMs on the aforementioned desktop hardware platform, respectively. In any case, each VM was allocated with 256MB memory and ran Ubuntu 10.04. The curves correspond to that each VM receives 1,200 key updates from the Device Key-Update module. In either case, we observe that the communication cost is roughly proportional to the number of VMs running on the hardware platform. In summary, we observe that Approach II is much more efficient than Approach I.
Augmented Key-Insulation Scheme
Augmented key-insulated symmetric key scheme offers a stronger security guarantee under certain circumstances. Its deployment and device-to-computer communication cost are essentially the same as the ones of the above key-insulated symmetric key scheme, except that the key update algorithms need to evaluate two more pseudorandom functions (e.g., AES-128). This explains why we do not repeat the implementation part. Let (G, E, D) be a secure symmetric key cryptosystem. The augmented key-insulated symmetric key scheme for secure two party communication is specified below. A key chain specified by Xi,0 is defined as Xi,t = fX i,t−1 (0) for 1 ≤ t ≤ N .
• Key Generation. This algorithm is executed in a secure environment. Suppose {Xi,0} 1≤i≤4 is a set of secrets uniformly chosen from {0, 1} k . Alice stores (X1,0, X2,0) on her computer, and (X3,0, X4,0) on her device; Bob stores (X1,0, X3,0) on his computer, and (X2,0, X4,0) on his device.
• Device Key-Update. At the beginning of time period t (1 ≤ t ≤ N ), Alice's device holds (X3,t−1, X4,t−1), and Bob's device holds (X2,t−1, X4,t−1). This algorithm includes the following steps.
• Encryption. For period t, set E SKt (t, M ) = E SKt (M ).
• Decryption. for period t, set D SKt ( t, C ) = D SKt (C). 
CONCLUSION
We presented the definition and constructions of key-insulated symmetric key schemes, and reported an implementation in the KVM environment.
